



## DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

TRAINING SQUADRON THIRTY-ONE (VT-31)  
501 BATAAN STREET SUITE B  
CORPUS CHRISTI TX 78419-5249

VT31INST 5530.1G

Code 00

05 MAR 2007

### TRAINING SQUADRON THIRTY-ONE INSTRUCTION 5530.1G

Subj: PHYSICAL SECURITY/FORCE PROTECTION

- Ref:
- (a) CNETINST 5530.2G (12 Mar 1998) Physical Security, Loss Prevention, Antiterrorism, and Naval Security Forces Ashore Programs
  - (b) COMTRAWINGFOURINST 5244.1F (3 Nov 2005) T-34C/T-44/TC-12B Aircraft Security Management Control Form
  - (c) VT31INST 11320.1G (24 Aug 2006) Promulgation of Fire Bill
  - (d) NASCORPCINST 5530.2B (7 Nov 1994) Auxiliary Security Force
  - (e) VT-31 Mishap Action Plan
  - (f) NASCORPCINST 5530.1C (31 Mar 2003) Physical Security Manual
  - (g) VT31INST 3710.1S (07 Jun 2006) Standard Operating Procedures
  - (h) OPNAVINST 5530.13C (26 Sep 2003) DON Physical Security Instruction for Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

1. Purpose. This instruction sets forth the procedures and responsibilities for physical security and force protection for the command as directed by references (a), (d), (g), and (h).

2. Cancellation. VT31INST 5530.1F

3. Responsibility. The Commanding Officer is responsible for the physical security of all squadron spaces, equipment, and personnel. The Physical Security Officer designated by the Commanding Officer will develop, implement, and manage the Physical Security Plan. All assigned squadron personnel are encouraged to familiarize themselves with this plan and immediately notify the Physical Security Officer of any security violations or incidents.

4. Physical Security Plan

a. General. Training Squadron THIRTY-ONE'S Physical Security is designated to protect all squadron assets and physical facilities assigned to VT-31, to include: Bldg 71, Bldg 72, Bldg 67, Hangar 57 west side second deck, portion of Hangar 57 east side second deck and temporary facilities, as required.

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b. Security Procedures. VT-31 is a tenant command of Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, TX and is therefore dependent on Base Security for most security requirements. The Physical Security Officer shall attend base Physical Security Review Committee (PSRC) meetings to coordinate squadron level support of the station security responsibilities.

(1) During flight operations and normal working hours, security is provided by base police, and is augmented by the CDO/SDO. The morning SDO will gain access to the duty office by signing out the key from the Wing Duty Officer. The Wing Duty Officer is authorized to release the duty office key to the CDO or SDO on the daily flight schedule or other staff officers listed on the duty office key list.

The evening SDO will return the key to the Wing Duty Officer at the end of his/her watch. At the completion of the evening watch, the CDO/SDO will physically inspect and secure all assigned squadron spaces, and log inspection results in the official log. After-hours checking of squadron facilities will be accomplished by base police (Flight Line Security).

(2) The Physical Security Officer is the squadron key control officer. The SDO, under the CDO direction, is responsible for local key control. The SDO will maintain a log of keys, (keys issues, to whom, date/time the keys were issued and returned, and the signatures of persons drawing or returning the security key). Keys will be kept secured in the duty office. The Physical Security Officer shall keep a master key list and update the duty office key access list at Training Air Wing FOUR as needed.

(3) The SDO, under CDO direction is responsible for control of the flare gun and shells. The gun and shells will be secured under lock and key in the duty office. The SDO will institute a system of control identical to that described above for key control.

(4) Squadron access is limited to those actually involved in flight operations. Visitors, maintenance personnel and contractors are to be escorted as per reference (b).

(5) The Physical Security Officer is responsible for assessing security requirements on a continuing basis. In meeting this need, a physical security review will be conducted

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annually using the survey checklist contained in reference (h).

c. Emergencies. The CDO and SDO shall take action as necessary to maintain the security for squadron spaces in emergency situations:

(1) Fires shall be handled per reference (c).

(2) Crises civil disturbances, air alerts, and acts of sabotage shall be coordinated with the Base OOD under the guidance of reference (f) (Appendixes B and C).

(3) Bomb threats or explosions shall be reported to the Base OOD and handled per reference (f) (Appendix A).

(4) Major accidents shall be reported and handled per reference (e).

(5) Natural disasters shall be handled per reference (g) and (f) (Appendix D).

d. Missing, Lost, Stolen, or Recovered Government Property (MSLR) Reports. All subject reports will be made per reference (h). The Security Officer is responsible for preparation of these reports.

(1) All personnel are responsible for maintaining office/space security to prevent loss, damage, or theft of government property.

## 5. Force Protection Plan

a. Vehicle Access. Vehicle access is controlled by an ID electronic gate located between Hangar 57 and Hangar 55. Assigned parking spaces surround the perimeter of Hangar 55. Assigned and unassigned parking is located outside of the flightline perimeter fence.

b. Protective Lighting System. Internal and external lighting is used as a deterrent to theft and intrusion. Internal lighting includes the hangar, office spaces and passageways. External lighting includes the apron areas surrounding Hangar 57.

### c. Threat Conditions

(1) Threatcon Normal- Exists when a general threat of

possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture.

(2) Threatcon Alpha- Exists when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel. The exact nature and extent are unpredictable and circumstances do not justify full implementation of Threatcon Bravo, however, it may be necessary to implement select Bravo measures as a result of intelligence or as a deterrent. Threatcon Alpha must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

(3) Threatcon Bravo- Exists when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in the Threatcon must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing hardship, affecting operational capability or aggravating relations with local authorities.

(4) Threatcon Charlie- Exists when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent. Implementation of this measure for longer than a short period of time will probably create hardship and effect peacetime activities of a unit and its personnel.

(5) Threatcon Delta- Exists when a terrorist attack has occurred, or when intelligence indicated that a terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this threatcon is declared as a localized warning.

d. Threat Condition Action/Response

(1) Threat Condition Normal- Be aware of current events. Maintain situational awareness. Note odd and particular vehicles, behavior or surveillance.

(2) Threat Condition Alpha-

a. At regular intervals, remind all personnel and dependents to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers. Watch for unidentified vehicles on or in the vicinity of installations. Watch for abandoned parcels or suitcases and any unusual activity.

b. Duty personnel must be available at all times. Key personnel should be available to seal off an area

immediately. Key personnel required to implement the security plan should be on call and readily available.

c. Secure buildings, rooms and storage areas when not in use.

d. Review SOP, orders and logistic requirements in preparation for higher threat conditions.

e. Review and implement security measures for high-risk personnel.

f. As appropriate, consult NAS security on threat and mutual anti-terrorist measures.

(3) Threatcon Bravo-

a. Repeat above measures and warn personnel of any other potential form of terrorist attack.

b. Keep personnel involved in implementing anti-terrorist contingency plans on call.

c. Check plans for implementing the next threatcon.

d. Move cars and objects (crates, trash containers) at least 25 feet from Hangar 57. Consider centralized parking and frequently inspect parking areas. Keep all personal and government vehicles locked with windows up at all times.

e. At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as throughout the day, inspect the interior and exterior of the hangar for suspicious packages.

f. Examine mail (above the regular examination process) for letter and parcel bombs. Check all deliveries and advise dependents to check packages delivered to homes.

g. Increase personal security around home, school bus stops and traveling off base. Remove nameplates and identifying markers from front of houses and vehicles. Make staff and dependents aware of situation to avoid rumors.

h. Physically inspect visitors and randomly inspect suitcases, parcels and other containers. Ensure proper dignity is maintained and ensure females are searched by females if the

situation and safety of others permits.

(4) Threatcon Charlie-

- a. Repeat above measures.
- b. Limit access points and access to Hangar 57 to absolute minimum.
- c. Increase patrols of Hangar and surrounding spaces.
- d. Erect barriers and obstacles (as may be directed by NAS security) in parking lot.

(5) Threatcon Delta-

- a. Repeat above measures.
- b. 100% controlled access to Hangar 57. Post guards at all active entrances to Hangar 57.
- c. All vehicles will park in the VT-31 designated parking area outside of the flight line perimeter fence.
- d. Coordinate with NAS security to implement any additional Threatcon Delta anti-terrorist measures as may be directed by the Commanding Officer NAS.
- e. In the event of a successful terrorist attack on Hangar 57, all survivors will regroup in the grassy area located beyond the VT-31 designated parking spaces outside the flight line perimeter fence. A head count will be conducted. There is a possibility that no one will be killed or injured and terrorists might have planted a second device to thwart rescue efforts.

6. Bomb Threat

a. A Telephonic Threat Complaint Form shall be readily accessible at each phone and should be used as a checklist if a bomb threat is received.

b. In the event a bomb threat is received the following action will be taken:

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(1) Using the format provided on the Telephonic Threat Complaint Form, record all information possible about the call and the caller. Then notify the duty office at 961-3350.

(2) The CDO/SDO will immediately notify NAS Security at 961-2282, CO, XO and the Force Protection Officer. Decide jointly if evacuation is appropriate and notify joint tenants.

c. If the decision is made to evacuate the building, the following steps will be taken.

(1) Exercise common sense. If the explosion seems imminent, pull a fire alarm to evacuate immediately. Call the fire department at 961-3333 and advise them the emergency is a bomb threat, not a fire.


(2) If time is available, use the duty office/watch personnel to assist in evacuation. Direct personnel to take their personal belongings. Any briefcases or parcels left behind will be suspect.

(3) Muster all personnel at least 500 feet from the building. This will be done in the grassy area beyond the squadron parking spaces located outside of the flightline perimeter fence.

(4) The CDO/SDO will take the Telephonic Bomb Threat Checklist, the CDO/SDO logbooks, squadron recall, base telephonic directory and evacuate the building. Await arrival of the NAS Emergency Response Team.

(5) Muster personnel outside and allow the NAS Police Force and the NAS Emergency Response Team to coordinate the bomb search. Ask evacuated personnel if any unfamiliar objects or personnel were seen when evacuating the building and report findings.

7. Action. VT-31 personnel shall react to each security situation as outlined and take action as appropriate.

  
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Distribution: (VT31INST 5216.1V)

List 1