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**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**  
COMMANDER TRAINING AIR WING SIX  
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PENSACOLA, FLORIDA 32508-5509

COMTRAWINGSIXINST 5530.2

**SEP 23 2010**

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COMMANDER, TRAINING AIR WING SIX INSTRUCTION 5530.2

From: Commander, Training Air Wing SIX

Subj: ANTITERRORISM/PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

Ref: (a) DODI 2000.16  
(b) OPNAVINST 3300.53B  
(c) OPNAVINST 5530.14 (Series)  
(d) NAS Pensacola 3300.3 (Series)  
(e) DOD O-2000.12 (Series)

Encl: (1) Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP)  
(2) Bomb Threat Procedures  
(3) Mailroom Operating Procedures for Suspicious Packages  
(4) Emergency Actions  
(5) Loss Prevention Plan  
(6) FPCON Tenant Specific Plan

1. Purpose. To provide Anti-Terrorism (AT), Physical Security policy and guidance for the staff of TRAWING SIX.

2. Situation. TRAWING SIX will remain viable targets for terrorist groups desiring to injure the reputation of the United States. To combat terrorist and other criminal threats a comprehensive fully integrated FP program must be implemented.

3. Scope. This instruction applies to all staff personnel attached to TRAWING SIX including military, DoD civilians, contractors and complements existing DoD and DoN directives. To integrate AT program requirements and responsibilities with NAS Pensacola in order to effectively deter, detect, defend against and mitigate potential attacks. The desired end-state of this program is prioritized in the following order: (1) Save lives, (2) Minimize mission degradation and (3) Protect property.

4. Background

a. The Antiterrorism and Physical Security Program is designed with the means and measures to fulfill force protection

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SEP 23 2010

and anti-terrorism requirements, safeguard personnel, and protect property.

b. The program includes:

(1) The safeguarding of property, resources, and personnel during normal operations, Force Protection Conditions (FPCONS), and contingencies.

(2) Instituting situational awareness and security responsibilities for all personnel.

(3) Providing a degree of protection and deterrence equivalent to the threat.

(4) Integrating this plan with the Naval Air Station Pensacola AT Plan as required by references (a) and (b).

c. Reference (c) addresses the Navy's Physical Security and Law Enforcement program and reference (d) provides guidance for general security, force protection guidance, and FPCON measures within the NAS Pensacola area of responsibility.

d. TRAWING SIX Commander's Intent. To provide support to NASP Commander, to the greatest extent possible, in executing the NASP overarching AT Program.

e. Task organization. The NASP Commanding Officer directs the AT program through operational staff, supporting organizations. Additionally, the Commanding Officer exercises operational control (OPCON), for AT purposes, over TRAWING SIX. Responsibilities of TRAWING SIX staff are as follows:

(1) NASP Antiterrorism Executive Council (ATEC). The ATEC is the executive steering committee that establishes AT Policy, directs AT courses of action and acts as the approving authority for command level AT resource allocation. Membership includes the NASP Commanding Officer (Chairman), Executive Officer (CO Chair), ATO (Facilitator) and others, as needed. The Training Air Wing Commander or Chief Staff Officer will attend these meetings when required.

SEP 23 2010

(2) NASP Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG). The ATWG develops and manages the Command AT program. The ATWG mission, membership requirements, group composition and duties of the ATWG are defined per enclosure (1). Sub-elements of the ATWG are the Threat Working Group (TWG) and Vulnerability Assessment Team. The TRAWING SIX AT Representative will attend and comply with the ATWG Charter, per reference (a) and (d).

(3) Auxiliary Security Forces (ASF). Training Air Wing SIX has no ASF personnel manning requirements.

(4) TRAWING SIX Chief Staff Officer. Consistent with the Commander's intent and concept of operations, provides direction and guidance as needed.

(a) Ensures Senior Watch Officers and Command Duty Officers (CDO) understand and exercise, as appropriate, the Blue Dart program and disseminate threat information to the chain of command and the NASP CDO.

(b) Assigns AT Representative.

(5) AT Representative.

(a) Acts as the lead staff officer for coordinating AT Training and other matters with the NASP ATO.

(b) Using "By Direction" authority, retains primary responsibility for the implementation, execution and revision of this instruction consistent with the Commander's intent.

(c) Shall be prepared to execute increased Force Protection Conditions (FPCON).

(d) Acts as advisor to the chain of command on all AT issues.

(e) Attends NASP ATWG meetings, as necessary.

(6) All TRAWING SIX military personnel, DOD Civilians and DOD contractors.

SEP 23 2010

(a) Shall complete AT Awareness Level I training annually.

(b) Report any suspicious activity to the NASP Security Department immediately. Security is an "all Hands" evolution.

f. Coordinating Instructions. The NASP Antiterrorism Officer (ATO) is the lead for coordinating AT operations with AT Working Group (ATWG) members.

5. Administration and logistics

a. This instruction applies to all DOD, active duty and reserve military personnel, foreign military personnel, Department of Homeland Security Personnel, Navy civilians, federal employees, contract personnel and family members while within AOR of TRAWING SIX Facilities. This order is effective for planning upon receipt.

b. Contracts for logistical support shall include antiterrorism (AT) provisions. An AT Logistics Checklist can be found in reference (d), see NASP ATO for assistance.

6. Command and signal

a. Command. See reference ((e) command relationships).

b. Signal

(1) FPCON notices and advisories. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will disseminate all hands FPCON notices and advisories. The PAO will activate the Command Information Bureau when directed by the Commanding Officer or designated representative.

(2) Command coordination. The Command Duty Officer will facilitate communications between the chain of command and NASP CDO.

(3) Threat Working Group (TWG). The AT representative will attend the NASP TWG meetings, as appropriate.

SEP 23 2010

(2) Manage the AT Program per DoD, SECNAV and OPNAV policies. Provide guidance and ensure compliance of all Tenant Commands to DoD, SECNAV, OPNAV and CRNSE ATPF instructions and directives.

b. Tenant Commands, as appropriate, will:

(1) Be familiar with the requirements of this instruction.

(2) Designate in writing an Anti-Terrorism Officer (ATO), and an alternate who will be responsible for all assigned spaces.

(3) Will designate a Key Custodian who will be responsible for all key controlled by that functional area as required in reference (c).

(4) Each area will establish a system for the daily end-of-the-workday security check of facilities, security containers, perimeters, equipment, etc. Office doors will be secured when the last occupant departs the office at the end of each workday and when working weekends and holidays.

c. Antiterrorism Officer will:

(1) Be the senior technical advisor for all Antiterrorism matters and identifying those areas in which antiterrorism measures are required.

(2) Provide technical and operational support to staff personnel with development of policy, procedure and AT assessments.

(3) The ATO will be guided in his specific duties as delineated in reference (a) through (d) and other applicable instructions.

(4) Will be a member of the ATWG, TWG.

d. DRAWING SIX Personnel (Military/Civilian).

SEP 23 2010

(2) Manage the AT Program per DoD, SECNAV and OPNAV policies. Provide guidance and ensure compliance of all Tenant Commands to DoD, SECNAV, OPNAV and CRNSE ATFP instructions and directives.

b. Training Air Wing SIX, as appropriate, will:

(1) Be familiar with the requirements of this instruction.

(2) Designate in writing an Anti-Terrorism Officer (ATO), and an alternate who will be responsible for all assigned spaces.

(3) Will designate a Key Custodian who will be responsible for all key controlled by that functional area as required in reference (c).

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(2) Provide technical and operational support to staff personnel with development of policy, procedure and AT assessments.

(3) The ATO will be guided in his specific duties as delineated in reference (a) through (d) and other applicable instructions.

(4) Will be a member of the ATWG, TWG.

d. TRAWING SIX Personnel (Military/Civilian).

SEP 23 2010

(1) Security is the legal and moral responsibility of every person assigned to TRAWING SIX. A physical security program must receive the attention and direction of all personnel in the chain of command.

(2) Be sensitive to the presence of strangers (unauthorized persons) in our buildings and spaces and either challenge such individuals or report their presence to your supervisor or to the command Security Officer.

8. Action. All individuals will be familiar with the contents and requirements of this instruction.



M. V. PROSPERI

Distribution:

Electronic only, via TRAWING SIX Website:

<https://www.cnatra.navy.mil/tw6/>

SEP 23 2010

**ANTI-TERRORISM AND FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP)**

1. Purpose. Provide information on Crisis Management Procedures in the event of a terrorist attack or threat.

2. Responsibilities

a. The Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Pensacola is responsible for the maintenance of law and order within the grounds and building with NAS. To enforce this authority, the Commander may take necessary military actions to protect life in sudden and unexpected terrorist attacks or other emergencies disrupting the normal process of government. As a tenant, TRAWING SIX will follow the guidelines set by the host activity. Reference (d) provides AT guidance and policy for the tenant commands onboard NAS Pensacola.

b. Experience has shown that alertness, coupled with common sense and personal initiative in taking security precautions, is the best deterrent to terrorist situations. NAS has established programs that will:

(1) Provide ongoing terrorist awareness training.

(2) Coordinate AT/FP actions with CNRSE region and tenant commands.

3. Force Protection Conditions (FPCON)

a. FPCON warnings are the principle means a Commander has to apply an operational decision on how to guard against a threat. They provide a management system that is adaptable to a full spectrum of security needs from minor civil disturbances to general war. These conditions will be employed to the extent required to provide the degree of security considered appropriate for the existing threat.

b. Reference (d) provides specific FPCON measures for tenants located on NAS.

SEP 23 2010

c. Further discussion on FPCONs and Threat Levels can be found in enclosure (6) of this document.

#### 4. Random Anti-Terrorism Measures

a. Random Anti-Terrorism Measures (RAMs) are used to enhance local FPCON measures. The implementation of RAMs.

(1) Serves as a tool to enhance the security of installations and tenant commands.

(2) Changes the security atmosphere within the installation. Such programs, when implemented in a truly random fashion, alter the external appearance or security "signature" of the installation to would-be terrorists and their supporters who may be providing surveillance assistance.

b. RAMs are procedures that are normally executed at specific FPCON levels. At any given level, implementing certain measures from a higher Force Protection Condition conveys an impression of increased vigilance and awareness to observers.

c. References (d) address the RAM program on NAS Pensacola.

#### 5. Installation and Facilities Access

a. Installation Access. Because TRAWING SIX is a tenant, installation access is governed by requirements contained in reference (d).

b. Each Directorate/Department within TRAWING SIX will develop Standard Operating Procedures to cover their responsibilities for access control of their workspaces.

#### 6. AT Training

a. AT Level I, II, III and IV training requirements are found in ref (a), (b) and (e).

b. Training objectives are to promote AT awareness and develop and identify personnel who have complied with annual Level I training requirements.

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COMTRAWINGSIXINST 5530.2

**SEP 23 2010**

c. TRAWING SIX ATO will ensure that all assigned military and civilian personnel receive Level I awareness annually and report to command and NAS Pensacola AT staff, as required by higher instructions.

SEP 23 2010

**BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES**

1. Purpose. To publish procedures to be carried out upon receipt of bomb threat.

2. Action

a. To avoid any possibility of loss of life and/or damage, it must be assumed that any bomb threat is not a hoax. Major disruptions to normal operations are not desired, but each threat must be treated seriously. All bomb threats will be taken in accordance with procedures outlined.

b. Individual receiving bomb threat will notify:

(1) NAS Security Dispatch at 850-452-3211/850-452-3333 emergency calls or the NAS Police Department Shift Supervisor at 850-452-2846/850-452-8888.

(2) Immediate Supervisor

c. After the call is complete:

(1) Complete Bomb Threat Incident Checklist.

(2) Provide the police with details of the telephone call.

(3) Make a full written record of the conversation and your impressions based on the information annotated on the telephonic bomb information card.

d. Upon receipt of warning decide on need for evacuation.

e. If evacuation is necessary, ensure that personnel evacuate according to procedure, and that handicapped employees are provided appropriate assistance.

f. Exit the building in the same manner as you would for a fire and proceed to an area at least 100 yards from the building and await the signal to return.

g. Evacuation Diagrams should be posted in each office and on each floor in all buildings.

SEP 23 2010

**Mail Room Operating Procedures for Suspicious Packages and Letters**

1. Every effort should be made to examine every piece of mail and look for suspicious characteristics.
2. If mail appears suspicious the supervisor or mail worker should try to contact the addressee to see if they recognize the package. If unable to locate the addressee, do not open it. The supervisor or designated mail worker should call the emergency dispatch center to report the suspicious package/letter. The first responders will be responsible for determining that the package is or is not a threat.
3. If available, and x-ray inspection shows a secondary container that may contain an unknown material, or if mail is opened and such a container is discovered, do not open or otherwise disturb the secondary container. Treat the secondary container as suspicious, unopened mail.
4. All personnel should know whom to contact in case of emergency. A list of all emergency phone numbers should be available to everyone and updated as assignments change. The list should be posted within the mailroom.
5. Be sure to specify where mailroom personnel should gather immediately after an evacuation, so that the supervisor on duty can account for each personnel. In some circumstances employees may be instructed to shelter-in-place. Depending on the circumstances and nature of the emergency, the first decision is whether to stay or leave.

SEP 23 2010

**EMERGENCY ACTIONS**

1. In the event of natural or man-caused disasters, the protection of personnel and classified material is the principal consideration to be initially made. The Department Head or the senior person in charge at the time of a disaster will determine, based upon situation and/or guidance received from NAS or TRAWING SIX staff, the need to evacuate premises; to relocate, etc.

2. Department Head will ensure that all personnel exit the premises, when required, in an orderly fashion. Time permitting, they will ensure that all classified material is properly stored; all electrical power is turned off; and all windows and doors are shut.

3. A fire drill or similar evacuation type drill should be held at least annually. Supervisors of handicapped employees will ensure their safe evacuation. This should be accomplished by having assistance required by handicapped employees during an emergency situation.

SEP 23 2010

**LOSS PREVENTION PLAN**

1. Purpose. To establish a Loss Prevention Plan to prevent loss of supplies, tools, equipment or other materials in use, storage, or transit, and during the issue process.

2. Background. The concern of the Department of the Navy is not only focused on the threat of criminal activity and acts of wrongdoing by forces external to the organizational unit, it is also specifically directed toward internal causes: theft and pilferage by those who have authorized access; inattention to physical security practices and procedures, and disregard for property controls and accountability.

3. Definitions

a. Property. Property consists of all assets. It includes both real and personal property; funds and negotiable instruments; tools and equipment; material and supplies; computer hardware and software; and information in the form of documents and other media, whether categorized as routine or special, unclassified or classified, non-sensitive or sensitive, critical, valuable, or precious.

b. Pilferage. Pilferage is petty larceny; stealing of small items, generally of stored goods.

c. Theft. Theft is a popular name for larceny. It is the taking of property without the owner's consent, with intent to deprive the owner of the value of same, and to appropriate it to the use of benefit of the person taking.

4. Responsibilities

a. Physical security of assigned TRAWING SIX spaces and equipment therein rests solely with the individuals inhabiting those spaces. All personnel should exercise individual responsibility for the care and protection of government property under his/her control/custody.

SEP 23 2010

b. All personnel are personally accountable for government-owned and assigned equipment. This accountability includes:

(1) The proper use of such equipment.

(2) Complying with the Command's physical security regulations with respect to protection of equipment.

(3) Promptly reporting any missing, lost, stolen, or RECOVERED equipment to the Security Manager or their immediate supervisor.

(4) Complying with established checkout procedures (e.g. accountability of all assigned property) when departing the Command.

SEP 23 2010

**FPCON/THREAT LEVEL INFORMATION**

This enclosure describes the Threat Level and FPCON system that will be used by Naval Air Station Pensacola in support of Commander Navy Region South East during times of increased readiness. They are supported by, DoDI 2000.16 and OPNAVINST 3300.53 Series and provide a management system appropriate for the existing threat. Installation specific measures can be found in reference (d)

The DoD Terrorist Threat Level is directed by DIA and is an intelligence assessment on the likelihood of a threat against DoD personnel, installations, or facilities. The four levels are:

HIGH - Terrorist group is operationally active and use mass casualty attacks as their preferred method of attack. There is a substantial DoD presence and the Operating Environment favors the terrorist.

SIGNIFICANT - Terrorist group is operationally active and attack of personnel is there preferred method of attack, or a group uses mass casualty attacks, but has limited operational activity. Operating Environment is neutral.

MODERATE - Terrorist groups are present, but there is no indication of anti-U.S. activity. Operating Environment favors the Host Nation or United States.

LOW - No group is present or group activity is non-threatening.

The five FPCONs in current use are:

FPCON NORMAL. A general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture.

a. Measure NORMAL 1: Secure and randomly inspect buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.  
(Action: all units/organizations)

SEP 23 2010

b. Measure NORMAL 2: Conduct random security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering facilities under the jurisdiction of the United States. (Action: Security Department)

c. Measure NORMAL 3: Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic. (Action: Security Department/Air Operations Department for airfields)

FPCON ALPHA. A general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and installations exists, the nature and extent of which is unpredictable. The measures in FPCON ALPHA must be capable of being maintained for an indefinite period of time.

a. Measure ALPHA 1: Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCON. (Action: all units/organizations)

b. Measure ALPHA 2: At regular intervals, inform personnel and family members of the general situation. Ensure personnel arriving for duty are briefed on the threat. Also, remind them to be alert for and report suspicious activities, such as the presence of unfamiliar personnel and vehicles, suspicious parcels, and possible surveillance attempts. (Action: PAO/all units/organizations/Security Department)

c. Measure ALPHA 3: The duty officer or personnel with access to building plans as well as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times. Plans should be in place to execute access control procedures. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on-call and readily available. (Action: Security/Fire/Medical/EM/PWD/Air Ops/CDOs/Tenant Duty Officers or Managers/PAO/Admin/AT Representatives)

d. Measure ALPHA 4: Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering installations under the jurisdiction of the United States. (Action: Security Department)

SEP 23 2010

e. Measure ALPHA 5: Initiate food and water Operational Risk Management (ORM) procedures, brief personnel on food and water security procedures, and report any unusual activities. (Action: Medical/EM/Safety)

f. Measure ALPHA 6: Test mass notification system. (Action: EM/PAO)

g. Measure ALPHA 7: Review all plans, identify resource requirements, and be prepared to implement higher FPCONS. (Action: All units/organizations)

h. Measure ALPHA 8: Review and, if necessary, implement security measures for high-risk personnel (HRP). (Action: Security Department)

i. Measure ALPHA 9: As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures. (Action: Naval Criminal Investigative Service/Security)

j. Measure ALPHA 10: Review intelligence, counter intelligence, and operations dissemination procedures. (Action: Naval Criminal Investigative Service/Security Manager)

FPCON BRAVO. An increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.

a. Measure BRAVO 1: Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCONS. (Action: all units/organizations)

b. Measure BRAVO 2: Enforce control of entry onto U.S. infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment, lucrative targets, and high profile locations; and randomly search vehicles entering these areas. Particular scrutiny should be given to vehicles that are capable of concealing a large IED (cargo vans, delivery vehicles) sufficient to cause catastrophic damage or loss of life. (Action: Security Department)

SEP 23 2010

c. Measure BRAVO 3: Identify critical and high occupancy buildings. Keep cars and objects (e.g., crates, trash containers) away from buildings to reduce vulnerability to bomb attacks. Apply this criterion to all inhabited structures to the greatest extent possible. Standoff distance should be determined by the following factors: asset criticality; the protection level provided by structure, IED/Vehicle Borne IED threat; and available security measures. Consider centralized parking. (Action: Security/PWD/all units/organizations)

d. Measure BRAVO 4: Secure and inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use. (Action: all units/organizations)

e. Measure BRAVO 5: At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at random intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages. (Action: all units/organizations)

f. Measure BRAVO 6: Implement mail-screening procedures to identify suspicious letters and parcels. (Action: Postal Staff/all units/organizations)

g. Measure BRAVO 7: Randomly inspect commercial deliveries. Advise family members to check home deliveries. (Security Department/PAO/AT Representatives)

h. Measure BRAVO 8: Randomly inspect food and water for evidence of tampering/contamination before use by DOD personnel. Inspections should include delivery vehicles and storage area/containers. (Action: Medical/NEX/Commissary/PWD/EM)

i. Measure BRAVO 9: Increase security/guard presence or patrol/surveillance of DOD housing areas, schools, messes, on-base clubs, and similar high-occupancy targets to improve deterrence and defense, and to build confidence among staff and family members. (Action: Security Department/Auxiliary Security Forces)

j. Measure BRAVO 10: Implement plans to enhance off-installation security of DOD facilities. In areas with Threat Levels of Moderate, Significant, or High, coverage includes facilities (e.g., DOD schools and daycare centers) and

SEP 23 2010

transportation services and routes (e.g., bus routes) used by DOD employees and family members. (Action: Security Department)

k. Measure BRAVO 11: Inform local security committees of actions being taken. (Action: Security Department/PAO/NCIS)

l. Measure BRAVO 12: Verify identity of visitors and randomly inspect their suitcases, parcels, and other containers. (Action: Security Department/All units/organizations)

m. Measure BRAVO 13: Conduct random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings. (Action: Security Department)

n. Measure BRAVO 14: As necessary, implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel. (Action: Security Department)

o. Measure BRAVO 15: Place personnel required for implementing AT plans on call; commanders should exercise discretion in approving absences. (Action: All units/organizations)

p. Measure BRAVO 16: Identify and brief personnel who may augment guard forces. Review specific rules of engagement including the use of deadly force. (Action: Security Department/Legal)

q. Measure BRAVO 17: As deemed appropriate, verify identity of personnel entering buildings. (Action: All units/organizations)

r. Measure BRAVO 18: Review status and adjust as appropriate OPSEC, COMSEC, and INFOSEC procedures. (Action: Security Manager)

s. Measure BRAVO 19: (airfield specific) As appropriate, erect barriers and man and establish checkpoints at entrances to airfields. Ensure identity of all individuals entering the airfield (flightline and support facilities) -- no exceptions. Randomly inspect vehicles, briefcases and packages entering the airfield. (Action: Security/Air Operations)

COMTRAWINGSIXINST 5530.2  
SEP 23 2010

t. Measure BRAVO 20. (airfield specific) Coordinate plans to safeguard aircraft departure and approach flight paths with local authorities. Be prepared to activate contingency plans and issue detailed air traffic control procedures. As appropriate, take actions to mitigate threat of surface-to-air missiles or standoff weapons that can be delivered from beyond the airfield perimeter. (Action: Security/Air Operations/TW-6/NCIS)

FPCON CHARLIE. Apply when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action or targeting of personnel or facilities is likely. Prolonged implementation of FPCON CHARLIE measures may create hardship and affect the activities of the unit and its personnel.

a. Measure CHARLIE 1: Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCON. (Action: To the greatest extent possible all units/organizations operating in this FPCON)

b. Measure CHARLIE 2: Recall additional required personnel. Ensure armed augmentation security personnel are aware of current rules of engagement and SOFAs. Review types of weapons and ammunition issued to augmentation security personnel; heightened threats may require employment of different weapons capabilities. (Action: Security Department/Legal)

c. Measure CHARLIE 3: Be prepared to react to requests for assistance, from both local authorities and other installations in the region. (Action: all units/organizations)

d. Measure CHARLIE 4: Limit access points to strictly enforce entry. Randomly search vehicles. (Action: Security Department/All units/organizations)

e. Measure CHARLIE 5: Ensure or verify identity of all individuals entering food and water storage and distribution centers, use sign in/out logs at access control/entry points, and limit and/or inspect all personal items. (Action: PWD/EM)

f. Measure CHARLIE 6: Initiate contingency monitoring for biological and chemical agents as required. Suspend contractors/off-facility users from tapping into facility water

SEP 23 2010

system (alternate locally developed measure should be executed when contractors are responsible for DOD water supplies or when water is provided by local (non-DOD) sources or agencies).

(Action: PWD/EM)

g. Measure CHARLIE 7: Increase standoff from sensitive buildings based on threat. Implement barrier plan to hinder vehicle borne attack. (Action: PWD/Fire/Crash/Security/AT Representatives - Note: Measure accomplished in FPCON BRAVO)

h. Measure CHARLIE 8: Increase patrolling of the facility to include waterside perimeters, if appropriate. Be prepared to assist local authorities in searching for threatening actions/persons outside the facility perimeter. For airfields, patrol or provide observation of approach and departure flight corridors as appropriate to the threat (coordinate with TSA, Marine Patrol, U.S.C.G., and local law enforcement as required to cover off-facility approach and departure flight corridors). (Action: Security Department/NCIS)

i. Measure CHARLIE 9: Protect all designated infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment. Give special attention to and coordinate with local authorities regarding infrastructure outside the military establishment. (Action: Security Department/PWD/NCIS/EM)

j. Measure CHARLIE 10: To reduce vulnerability to attack, consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities and coordinate any other precautionary measures taken outside the installation perimeter. (Action: Security Department/NCIS)

k. Measure CHARLIE 11: Consider searching suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., being brought onto the installation through access control points and consider randomly searching suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., leaving. (Action: Security Department)

l. Measure CHARLIE 12: Review personnel policy procedures to determine course of action for family members. (Action: Housing/EM/Security)

SEP 23 2010

m. Measure CHARLIE 13: Review access procedures for all non-U.S. personnel and adjust as appropriate. For airfields, consider terminating visitor access to the flight line and support facilities. (Action: Security Department/Air Operations)

n. Measure CHARLIE 14: Consider escorting children to and from DOD schools (among options to consider are escorting school buses, recommending parents escort children to/from school, etc.). (Action: PAO)

o. Measure CHARLIE 15: (airfield specific) Reduce flying to essential operational flights only. Implement appropriate flying countermeasure as directed by the flight Wing Commander (military aircraft) or TSA (civilian aircraft). Consider relief landing ground actions to take for aircraft diversions into and out of an attacked airfield. Consider augmenting fire-fighting details. (Action: Air-Operations/TW-6/Security)

FPCON DELTA. Apply in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is imminent. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a localized condition.

a. Measure DELTA 1: Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCON. (Action: To the greatest extent possible all units/organizations operating in this FPCON)

b. Measure DELTA 2: Augment guards as necessary. (Action: Security Department)

c. Measure DELTA 3: Identify all vehicles within operational or mission support areas. (Action: Security Department/AT Representatives)

d. Measure DELTA 4: Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the installation. Selected pre-screened and constantly secured vehicles used to transport escorted very important personnel are exempted. (Action: Security Department)

SEP 23 2010

e. Measure DELTA 5: Control facility access and implement positive identification of all personnel--no exceptions.

(Action: Security Department/to the greatest extent possible all units/organizations operating in this FPCON)

f. Measure DELTA 6: Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., brought into the installation. (Action: Security Department)

g. Measure DELTA 7: Close DOD schools and/or escort children to/from DOD schools as required. (Action: Not applicable)

h. Measure DELTA 8: Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and of parking areas. (Action: Security Department/to the greatest extent possible all units/organizations operating in this FPCON)

i. Measure DELTA 9: Restrict all non-essential movement. (Action: Security Department/to the greatest extent possible all units/organizations operating in this FPCON)

j. Measure DELTA 10: (airfield specific) Cease all flying except for specifically authorized operational sorties. Be prepared to deploy light aircraft and/or helicopters for surveillance tasks or to move internal security forces. Implement, if necessary, appropriate flying countermeasures. (Action: Air Operations/TW-6)

k. Measure DELTA 11: (airfield specific) As appropriate, airfields should prepare to accept aircraft diverted from other stations. (Action: Air Operations)

l. Measure DELTA 12: If permitted, close public and military roads and facilities. If applicable, close military roads allowing access to the airfield. (Action: Security/PWD)