

Scratching Post



Assess, Adapt, *Attack!*



VT-10 IS A SUBORDINATE OF TRAINING WING SIX BASED ABOARD NAS PENSACOLA, FL



Wishap Free Flight Hours
Through 31Dec08

133,600

About VT-10

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Questions?

Email the Program Leader
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VT-10 has an 80 member Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps instructor staff that currently trains over 300 Student Officers annually. Training Squadron TEN has been awarded seven Meritorious Unit Commendations and Seven Chief of Naval Education and Training "Shore / Technical Training Excellence Awards", the most recent in 2005. "Wildcat"safety initiatives have earned the squadron Twenty-one Chief of Naval Operations Safety Awards, the most recent in 2005. In 2004 and 2005 the command was awarded the U.S. Navy Pettibone Safety Publication Award for the Scratching Post newsletter.

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Assess, Adapt, *Attack!*

Lt Col Jeffrey "Crunch" Macloud, Commanding Officer

Wildcats -

VT-10 has a new safety motto: "Assess, Adapt, *Attack!*"

Here's what it means.

Assess: Every sortie, every training event, every time you drive your car or take your boat out, is a unique evolution that requires identification and assessment of risk. It could be as trivial as the risk of being late for an appointment, or as serious as the risk of an aircraft mishap. Competent professionals habitually and routinely assess risk.

Adapt: Plans (even standardized ones) are great and necessary. But plans never survive contact with reality. You must adapt your plans, deliberately or in real-time, to mitigate the unexpected risks you encounter. Mitigation could be as simple as reorganizing your schedule to accommodate an important pop-up event, or as complex as an unplanned landing at an emergency divert field to avoid flight through rapidly developing severe weather. Competent professionals naturally adapt to emerging conditions rather than stubbornly adhere to obsolete plans.

Attack: Let's face it - the safest place for an aircraft is in the hangar. But that's not our business. Our job is to attack the mission within acceptable levels of risk. By assessing what those risks are and adapting our plans to mitigate them as much as feasible, we can attack the mission safely and effectively. Your job is not simply to be safe. You can do that by staying home. Your job is to accomplish the mission safely. Work on your own competence and professionalism just as you would work to accomplish the mission. Competent professionals hold themselves accountable to standards and to safe mission accomplishment.

One last thought. Don't think of this new motto linearly. You're doing all three of these things at the same time in different aspects of whatever you're doing. You should never stop assessing and adapting while you're attacking. ***And you should ALWAYS be attacking!***

CO

When Was Our Last Class A MISHAP?

CDR Thad "Mudd" Dobbert, Executive Officer

Did you even know that VT-10 had a Class A mishap? Did you know it was only 8 years ago? September 27, 2000 is a day we should all remember and take a moment to think about what we do, the dangers we face on a daily basis, and pledge our devotion to not be complacent, fly safe and make the best and right decisions. Take a walk in the Fat Cat Lounge, note the pictures, and honor those that have fallen accomplishing the mission we do here.

This quarter's newsletter is designed to make you think about the things we do, start out the new year with the right safety mindset, and never forget our lost comrades.

MUDD

This Could Happen Again!

VT-10 Safety

On September 27, 2000 a VT-10 T-34C launched from NPA and proceeded to the MOA and would never return. The training performed that day was per the FTI and was performed on a daily basis. Due to its privileged nature, the actual SIR will be briefed at the next AOM. The following is a simulated example of a Serious Incident Report (SIR) of what could happen **TODAY**:

SUBJ/AVIATION SIR//

RMKS/*****

1. THIS ENDORSEMENT CONCERNS A SEVERE HAZARD TO NAVAL AVIATION.

SUMMARY: A VT-10 T-6 departed Pensacola at 1600Z. The MISHAP Aircraft proceeded to the Operating Area to perform training procedures. Radar Reports show the MISHAP aircraft performed maneuvers at or above 8000ft when it began to rapidly lose altitude. MISHAP aircraft continued a rapid descent until impact. Both MISHAP Pilot and MISHAP Student were found inside the aircraft although the ejection sequence had been initiated.

FATALITIES: One Flight Instructor / One Flight Student

CAUSAL FACTORS: MISHAP Pilot failed to properly recover from an out-of-control situation.

MISHAP Pilot failed to initiate ejection passing 6,000 ft

MISHAP Student failed to initiate ejection passing
6,000 ft

RECOMMENDATIONS: Identify the Hazards
Assess Hazards
Make Risk Decisions
Implement Controls
Supervise

SAFETY'S COMMENTS:

VT-10 Aviation Safety Officer (ASO Class 08-5)

When reviewing any MISHAP one must ask yourself "what went right what went wrong"? Obviously in this situation everything went wrong because both are dead. But think of what you would do as the SDO, are you familiar with the pre-mishap plan, are you confident you could run the initial stages of this plan with out flaws? I would submit no one could do this process flawlessly but could you be effective in doing what was required and are you able to handle any contingencies that may arise because every mishap is different. Think of what you would do and how effective you would be when reviewing this mishap or any other mishap in the future.

VT-10 Ground Safety Officer (ASO Class 08-6)

Only part of the above SIR is an example of what could happen. Some of it compares exactly to the actual VT-10 SIR of 27September2000. Unfortunately, that part is the fatalities section. An IP and an SWSO died while executing training at VT-10. I'm sure things were "Standard" that day, a term I hear so often in the brief. It is the "Standard" things we see everyday that are under assessed that can kill us. Stay focused, and continue to fly safe.

VT-10 Safety Officer (ASO Class 09-1)

VT-10 lost two valued service members back in 2000 in an incident with parallels to this simulated SIR topic. As a T-6 Instructor Pilot and the Squadron Safety Officer two things jump out at me immediately. First, are you thinking about the decision to egress BEFORE you get to the plane, back in the briefing room? And second, are we, as a crew, addressing the ground as a bonafide threat and NATOPS limits when we should be?

For those who believe the T-6, or the T-1 for that matter, won't experience some unexpected problem of the worst degree because we do these maneuvers every day and they are modern airframes, consider this - just weeks ago we had an incident where a T-6 appears to have transitioned from a developed, normal spin, into a spiral...and it didn't recover normally. Final determination is pending, but two experienced IPs, applying proper Boldface procedures, ended up spinning/spiraling for 17 seconds, finally stopping at 8800'MSL with the pull-up recovery taking them down to 7300'. If you do the math from the NATOPS (Steady state spins), these IPs were about 6-7 seconds from passing the uncontrolled ejection minimums! Would you know what your altitude limit was and be ready to execute?

As a pilot I am always trying to think in the back of my mind, "If things go bad right now, what are my options". In fact, on take off roll, in between the coordinated normal calls I am telling myself, "I'm aborting, I'm aborting", until the plane rotates because it costs me nothing to be expecting a problem and be ready to react. If you aren't prepared with the right mindset, then you have already made a mistake.

There are a lot of details in the mission planning process. One of the things we teach here is attention to detail. Everyone briefs Ejections before they fly in a T-6 because our NATOPS brief requires it. But do we, as a crew, really get into the details? How many times on a Cross Country have we sat down and actually looked at the terrain under our route? We get spoiled flying around at Sea Level, so much so that most students don't think anything of the fact that our ejection envelopes are AGL, not MSL. What does that mean to me? It means that when approach control (let's say over the 2000' hills of Tennessee) descends me to 8000' inbound, I might already be under the uncontrollable ejection limit. Or how about our VNAV routes where the chart says there are obstacles up to 1200' MSL and we are flying at 2500' MSL?

Do our young WSOs/NFOs leave here understanding the importance of detailed route knowledge and how something simple like terrain changes can change your life in seconds? The tools are all there. Let's all keep using them so we stay aware of our environment. Assess (route knowledge), Adapt (change your ejection envelope mindset if needed), Attack! (Execute safely).

OK, Now what?

Capt Matthew "Cooter" Farley

When flying B1's, generally having enough gas to do a mission is usually not a problem. After all 200,000lbs of gas is, well, a lot of gas. However, we learned that no matter how much you have, eventually it will run out. Flash to 2004. Operating out of Diego Garcia was a pretty good deal compared to some of our other compatriots who slept in tents in the desert. A pristine tropical island in the middle of nowhere is a pretty good spot to be right? Well, there are some hazards associated such as the Brit club, unlimited snorkeling, fishing, long walks on the beach...anyway, back to the story. Diego is so far away from anywhere else to land that we were required to have extra fuel on hand just in case we needed to divert. So after a long sortie (average 17+ hours) and 3-4 air-refuelings and taking a little "extra" gas, the jet was ready for the dash back to the island. Needless to say coming off that last tanker the urge to go fast was a strong one. So in typical crew dog fashion we'd bleed the tanker dry, sweep the mighty BONE's wings back to 67 degrees, descend to a good cruising altitude, light the burners and with the occasional super-sonic dash we were almost guaranteed to make Mongolian BBQ at the club. Well this particular week the weather had been iffy. There was a typhoon hanging around not too far away making for some windy and rainy conditions. Now, when your flight lasts almost an entire day, if the weather is bad when you take-off, you would expect



it to be a lot better when you get back the next day right? Not this time it seems. After an extra long mission with a couple of retaskings, the fun meter had been pegged. I won't say we burned a bit too much fuel on the way home, lets just say mmmm...we couldn't account for some of the gas the fine KC-135 folks had given us. After checking in about 3 hours out we determined that it was very unlikely we could land there. Diego is a slick runway when its wet, and the winds and rain had us way out of crosswind limits. As a crew, we made the determination to divert while we still had the fuel to do so. We turned to the nearest divert location of Seychelles and were on our way. Unfortunately, the current political climate did not lend itself to having a fully armed bomber landing there. Shortly after announcing our intentions, a direct order to turn around and land at Diego came across

one of our comm devices in the jet. It was from the Wing Commander himself. Now this leads us to another conversation which is best reserved for another case study. Let's stay focused on getting the jet back to the island. So here we are, already under the curve for SOP fuel, getting tossed around in some nasty weather, not allowed to divert, and almost positive we could not land our airplane at home plate. Forward to arrival at Diego. We orbited waiting for the weather to improve, which it never did. With approx 1 hr of fuel left, and at least a 4 hour flight to the nearest divert, we were running out of options. Landing was not one of those options with tropical storm force winds. We discussed ejection procedures, where to best punch out at, and who would have shark watch first. Then our luck changed for the better. An emergency KC-135 was somehow able to take off in those conditions. I will be eternally grateful to those guys because the conditions were pushing the limits for a safe launch and there was zero chance for them to turn around and recover on the island. Anyway, we finally got the gas, turned to the North and were on our way for a 6 hour flight to sunny Al-Udeid. After overflying at least 5 nations without any diplomatic clearances and being told to go away by at least 6 controllers, we managed to at last land our weary aircraft at Al-Udeid. After all was said and done, our 23.0 hour mission was the longest B1 combat sortie to date. When you figure in the brief, ground ops and debrief, it turned into a 31 hour day with no sleep. So what's the lesson? You can't make gas so use it wisely, be ready for anything, and please be nice to your Tanker bros. You just might need them more than you think!

COOTER

CRM Through ADC Failure

Capt Stacy Jones

Out in area one we were running through some standard Contact maneuvers when our instruments basically disappeared and were replaced by big red X's. I took control of the plane from my student and stopped what we were doing. I confirmed with the student that he had also lost all his instrumentation. What I did not know at the time was that the ADC had completely failed, which consequently took away my ADI, CDI, VVI, airspeed and altimeter. I directed him

to take out his checklist and open to the avionics section. We shortly discussed what we had lost in each of our cockpits and I told the student to run through the checklist. I initially did not open my checklist at all but I quickly realized that the checklist the student was running was just not making sense to me. Therefore, I took out mine and read through some of the other options. Once the correct checklist was agreed upon, I directed him to read it out loud to me



and we performed the items as a crew. The checklist did nothing to fix the problem. I made a decision at that point to talk to ATC and return to base. Halfway home I decided to declare an emergency only because of the possibility of screwing up the landing with the degraded and difficult to read standby instruments. Good CRM was used in discussing what we had lost, realizing we were initially running the wrong checklist, and then conducting the correct one before we proceeded any further. Besides directing the student to run the checklist, the only thing else I directed him to do was, "Keep an eye on my airspeed and altitude". He did a very nice job on reading out airspeed and altitude from the standby instruments while coming into the landing/flare at Sherman field. He went well above what I was expecting for a 2nd ride contact student without even being asked to do so. For anyone who has shot an approach in the SIM on standby instruments, you are aware that if it had been an IMC day this could have been a very serious emergency. Lessons learned: CRM works; students, even early on can be very helpful members of the crew; AOA indexer *can* actually be used for something.

CAPT Jones

SAFETY –

It's an all hands effort.

Assess the risk

Adapt your plans to mitigate the risk and continue to adapt

Attack the mission once risks are acceptable while continuing to assess and adapt.

